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Delinquency among majority and minority youths in Cologne,
Mannheim and Brussels: the role of religion
Sarah Carol, Freya Peez and Michael Wagner
Institute of Sociology and Social Psychology, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
ABSTRACT
The news about sexual assaults and robbery committed by mostly
young North African males on New Year’s Eve of 2015/2016 in
Cologne and elsewhere went around the world. It triggered a
revival of the question of the role religion plays in crime, in
particular whether Muslims are more criminal. To answer this
question, we investigate ethnic minority and majority youths’
delinquency in Cologne, Mannheim (Germany) and Brussels
(Belgium) using unique large-scale datasets. Our results indicate
that youths in Cologne are not exceptionally violent. In line with
previous research, we find that religiosity is overall accompanied
by lower levels of delinquency (vandalism, property offence, drug
abuse, bullying), particularly among Muslims. However, in the case
of violence, we reveal the opposite pattern. Yet, we discover that
these acts are primarily committed by youths who describe
themselves as religious without practising the abstinent lifestyle
(i.e. abstaining from binge drinking) prescribed by some religions.
KEYWORDS
Delinquency; religion;
abstinence; Islam; Germany
1. Introduction
The events of New Year’s Eve, 2015/2016 in Cologne are still fiercely debated. About 600
persons were robbed, beaten or sexually harassed, some were even raped. Media reports
quickly pointed towards men from North African countries as the main suspects
(Polizei Köln 2016; Staatskanzlei 2016). This has unleashed a controversy in the media
(e.g. TAZ, Kölner Stadtanzeiger) about the clash of cultures, especially the influence of
ethnic and religious backgrounds on crime (Hennen 2016; Klask 2016). As these events
have coincided with waves of mostly Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan refugees arriving in
Germany, the incident has fuelled a discussion about immigration and its consequences
for social cohesion in Germany. In response to the media portrayal of these groups (pri-
marily composed of Muslims), the Council of Muslims (Zentralrat der Muslime) has
repeatedly emphasised that Muslims who take their religion serious do not commit
these and other crimes (Wirtz 2016; Zeit 2016).
The societal reactions to this event have not only focused on the refugee status and
country of origin of these male immigrants but also triggered the revival of a classic
research question in criminology: How does religiosity relate to delinquency? The question
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is arguably highly relevant in Germany. Germany has been an immigration country for
more than 50 years: Post-war West Germany experienced – like other Western European
countries – waves of guest-worker migration, primarily from Turkey and Southern
Europe (Bade and Oltmer 2007). Despite vast developments in socio-economic integration
(e.g. Alba, Sloan, and Sperling 2011), the question of minority integration is not off the table,
and it is still intensely debated. Slowly, the focus of the debate has shifted from ethnicity to
religion, borrowing from earlier debates taking place in the US. The debates in the US and
Europe are fundamentally different, however, which makes it interesting to complement
findings for the US with those for Europe. While immigrant religions are often viewed as
bridges to integration in the US, they are conceived as a barrier to integration in Europe
(Foner and Alba 2008). Similarly, studies from the US, and their insights into the relation-
ship between crime and religiosity, are difficult to transfer to the European context due to its
different religious structures and composition. The US is a country with a large population
of Christians who are on average fairly religious (Norris and Inglehart 2012); the Muslim
minority population is relatively small (Smith 2015). Germany, by contrast is home to
approximately four million immigrants and their descendants from countries with a
Muslim majority (Laurence 2012). This relatively religious minority faces a relatively secu-
larised majority group without migration background (e.g. Diehl and König 2009). The rare
findings on Muslim minorities in the US are also difficult to transfer to Europe, as these
minorities are on average more educated than those in Europe (Sander 2010).
While the tenor of the European debate pointed to higher levels of crime and delin-
quency among minorities from countries with a Muslim majority (e.g. Baier et al.
2010), religious denomination should not be equated with individual levels of religiosity
– Muslims and Christians are not homogeneous groups. As we will outline in our theor-
etical framework, there are well-established theories that predict both lower and higher
levels of crime and delinquency among the pious.
We therefore add to the debate an empirically and theoretically comprehensive over-
view of the role of religiosity for a broad set of delinquency measures across different reli-
gious denominations and ethnic groups (as a proxy for the denomination), while taking
other important explanatory factors such as parents’ level of education and monitoring,
peers, and experienced violence into account. We base our analyses on large-scale
survey data collected in the last decade among youths in two cities with a high percentage
of immigrants as well as their descendants – Cologne (30%, Ministerium für Arbeit, Inte-
gration und Soziales des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen 2016) and Mannheim (44%)1 in
Western Germany. To cross-validate our findings on youths in Cologne and Mannheim
(Germany), we investigate in a second analyses, youths in Brussels (Belgium), which is
situated near Cologne and Mannheim and characterised by a high level of diversity.
About 32% of Brussel’s population were born abroad (statistics are based on nationality
and place of birth, Deboosere et al. 2009). Recently, Brussels also became focal point of
coordinated crime where terrorists committed attacks in the name of religion (Fyffe
2016). We differentiate in our analyses between youths without immigrant background
(abbreviated with the term ‘majority youths’) and youths of immigrant origin, which
means that they have at least one parent who immigrated to Germany or Belgium. We
label this group ‘minority’. Minority youths are particularly interesting to study as they
tend to exhibit higher probabilities to commit crimes compared to the first generation
of migrants (Tonry 1997).
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While the media debate hints at a negative role of religiosity, this relationship is far
from being conclusive in the scholarly debate. A large majority of studies have found reli-
giosity to be linked with a lower likelihood of crime (C. J. Baier and Wright 2001).
However, for certain immigrant groups, recent studies (e.g. Baier 2014) have also discov-
ered the opposite in connection with violence. As this finding has been the subject of some
controversy, we would like to revisit this finding in multivariate analyses. To the theoreti-
cal debate we contribute a refined argument on the religiosity–crime link by specifying the
effect of religiosity for different types of religious followers. We group individuals along the
two dimensions of subjective religiosity and the amount of alcohol consumed in the past
(as one indicator for an abstinent lifestyle). We distinguish between those who are
seriously religious and abstained from binge drinking in the past (type I) versus those
who only perceive themselves to be religious without living an abstinent lifestyle (type
II). In addition, we distinguish between those who do not describe themselves as religious
but abstain (type III) and those who do not describe themselves as religious and do not
abstain from binge drinking (type IV). Recent terrorist incidents have taught us that a
new profile of violent actors is crystallizing out: one in which individuals combine a
strong religious identification with a previous lifestyle that is not in keeping with that
identification in its drug and alcohol excesses (Hopkins 2015; Kanol Forthcoming;
Kiefer et al. 2017; Lutz and Reuscher 2017). Our paper also represents a methodological
contribution to existing research by investigating meaningful locations, including a
wide array of delinquency measures and employing sophisticated multi-level modelling
techniques, which have often been lacking in previous research (see Adamczyk, Freilich,
and Kim 2017).
Our study underlines that, in most cases, individual religiosity seems to suppress delin-
quency. However, we find exceptions to the rule if we look at victim-involved violence. We
unearth that those youths who describe themselves as religious but have not always fol-
lowed an abstinent lifestyle (i.e. engage in binge drinking) are the ones who are more
violent. Finally, delinquency can be partly traced back to perceptions of exclusion and
deprivation. Our findings have important implications for the scholarly and societal
debate that have either deemed religion as a breeding ground of conflict or as a blessing.
Generally speaking, binge drinking might be an indicator of a group subculture that also
includes other elements including an orientation towards more radical elements in the
religious community.
2. Theoretical background
2.1. The relationship between crime and individual religiosity
The term ‘crime’ denotes a behaviour that violates the institutionalised norms of a society
by breaking rules or laws, and is stronger than deviance (norm-violating behaviour
according to Jenness and Goodman 2006; and perceived so by others, e.g. Lamnek
2007). Thus, it can be formally sanctioned (Scott and Marshall 2005). Criminal behaviour
of juveniles, most commonly labelled as ‘delinquency’, emphasises their minor significance
in comparison to criminal behaviour of adults (Williams and McShane 2003, 119). The
perception of whether an act is delinquent is therefore subject to the definition of societal
and legal standards of the group in power (Lamnek 2007).
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In line with previous research, we distinguish between crimes causing physical (e.g.
physical violence) and psychological harm (e.g. bullying), as well as acts involving
objects (e.g. property offence and vandalism). Additionally, substance use is a prominent
indicator for victimless crime (Adamczyk 2012; Baier 2014; Pirutinsky 2014).
Religion is an important feature in understanding criminal behaviour: in the past, reli-
gious communities defined moral and immoral behaviour, which also extended to crim-
inal behaviour (Palmisano 2001, 134). Against this backdrop, we consider it important to
revisit the role of religiosity for criminal behaviour. Four hypotheses have been put
forward by previous research that can help us to understand the relationship between
criminal behaviour and religiosity. First, the hellfire hypothesis, introduced by Hirschi
and Stark (1969), states that religious people will refrain from sinful and illegal acts, in
fear of suffering in hell after death. The concept of sin is inherent to all religions, and
believers are compelled to pray and confess to make up for their sinful behaviour. Chris-
tian religious communities propagate the golden rule that you should do to others as you
would have them do to you (e.g. Luke 6:31) but also Muslim communities have similar
rules (e.g. “None of you truly believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for
himself”, An-Nawawī, Kitab Al-Arba’in Forty Hadith 13, 256. Koranic verse) because
they have a strong interest in promoting social conformity, law-abiding behaviour and
preventing crime among their members. The religious community can more easily
persist if all members conform to the same norms. So, in addition to secular norms, the
religious community imposes moral norms on its members, functions as a sanctioning
system, and threatens its members with a terrifying and thus costly after-life in case of
delinquency (Hirschi and Stark 1969). Up to now it provides one of the most popular
framings for examining associations between criminal offences and religiosity (Baier
and Wright 2001).
Even though Hirschi and Stark (1969) came to falsify the hypothesis in their initial
study, the idea was so convincing that it was further investigated. C. J. Baier and
Wright (2001) conducted a meta-analysis of the association between crime and religiosity.
They found support for the hellfire hypothesis and concluded that religiosity has a statisti-
cally significant, moderately sized negative effect on crime. Other research has cemented
this finding by looking at single measures of delinquency and crime. They have found, for
instance, religious attachment to be related to property offences (Adamczyk 2012), vio-
lence (Baier 2014) and drug abuse (Salas-Wright et al. 2012). Again other research has
treated crime as a uniform construct and has not differentiated between forms of religios-
ity. Nevertheless, they have often found that religiosity inhibits crime (e.g. Abu-Rayya et al.
2016; Evans et al. 1995). This leads us to expect:
Individuals who are more religious are less engaged in delinquent behaviour (H1: Hellfire
hypothesis).
However, there is an important argument in favour of refining this hypothesis and treating
crime measures separately, which leads us to the second hypothesis. Using data of the US
and including different Protestant streams, Burkett andWhite (1974) extended the hellfire
to the anti-asceticism hypothesis. They claim that religiosity is a meaningful explanation
only for acts that are not also condemned by secular institutions, such as victim-involved
crimes (Cochran and Akers 1989). Victimless crimes (e.g. substance use such as Mari-
huana) form one subclass of a setting where religious norms are more meaningful
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(Burkett and White 1974), since secular norms are ambiguous and not always explicitly
disapproving (Cochran and Akers 1989). While secular institutions sometimes tolerate
substances such as Marihuana (e.g. in the Netherlands), religious organisations step in
and condemn substance use through their teachings and the enforcement of social
control, which constitute the mechanisms behind the postulated effect of religiosity on vic-
timless crimes. C. J. Baier and Wright (2001) found the effect of religiosity on crime to be
significantly stronger when associated with non-violent crimes, which is in line with the
anti-asceticism hypothesis. While this research focused on the US exclusively, we will
apply it to European data, which include Christians and Muslims. Particularly for
Europe, which hosts a significant group of Muslims, the mechanism is interesting to
study because Koranic teachings promote an ascetic lifestyle and view the consumption
of mind-altering substances critically (e.g. Michalak and Trocki 2006). Thus, religious
individuals should adhere to these type of regulations, which implies a steep relationship
between substance use and religiosity. We will therefore predict:
Religiosity lowers the likelihood of drug abuse compared to other forms of delinquency for
which religiosity is expected to play no significant role (H2: Anti-asceticism hypothesis).
Besides the relationship between individual crime and religiosity, we expect religious con-
texts to play a role in crime and delinquency. The hypothesis on the role of the moral com-
munity is the third key hypothesis. Cochran and Akers (1989), building on Stark, Kent,
and Doyle (1982; see also Regnerus 2003; Welch, Tittle, and Petee 1991), have focused
on the role of the aggregate religiosity within schools. How do classmates affect the indi-
vidual propensity to commit violent acts? Following the logic of Stark (1996), Pearce and
Haynie (2004) who build on Durkheim’s (2014 [1897]) extensive work, social control is
again the key mechanism. Previous research outlined a direct and a moderator effect of
the religious community (interacted with individual religiosity); we focus on the direct
effect. In schools where students are on average more religious, the pious students will
exercise more social control over the behaviour of their classmates to ensure compliance
to moral norms, religious rules and the community, and thereby prevent anomia and
deviance. The basic tenet of this hypothesis reads as follows:
A higher mean level of religiosity in school classes limits delinquent behaviour (H3: Moral com-
munity hypothesis).
2.2. Ethno-religious sources of crime
Previous research has also pointed out that immigrant origin is important in understand-
ing the relationship between crime and religiosity. While religiosity was associated with
less violent behaviour among students in Turkey (Kemme and Kolberg 2013), research
on Muslim minorities in Germany demonstrated a null effect (Brettfeld and Wetzels
2011; Walburg 2014, 241), but only if a whole range of values (likely to be related to reli-
giosity) were included simultaneously. D. Baier (2014), however, found even a negative
relationship. In these studies, religiosity was measured by using the classic items (e.g. fre-
quency of praying, visiting places of worship, subjective/self-rated religiosity); but one
study also included measures of fundamentalist beliefs (e.g. seeing one’s religion as the
only true religion). In this study, immigrant students (Muslim and Christian) were
more likely to commit victim-involved violence if they adhered to this item (Brettfeld
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and Wetzels 2011). However, most of these studies located the source of a higher level of
victim-involved delinquency among minorities (especially in subsequent generations of
Muslims) in different norms: in particular masculinity norms combined with high
levels of religiosity without necessarily following an abstinent lifestyle (Baier 2014;
Windzio and Baier 2007). Individuals who show an abstinent lifestyle in line with
certain religious doctrines refrain from drinking alcohol, which can trigger aggressive
behaviour as experimental research suggests (Raskin White 2014). D. Baier (2014, 122)
therefore concludes ‘It is necessary to investigate to what extent these adolescents’ pro-
fession to their creed is an expression of religious commitment or whether it is, more
or less, mere lip-service’.
The roots for this type of delinquent might lie in perceived exclusion. Individuals who
perceive themselves or their group to be discriminated against are more likely to become
delinquent (see Burt, Simons, and Gibbons 2012). Muslim minorities are more likely to be
exposed to exclusion because their group placement is towards the bottom of natives’
ethnic hierarchies (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007) and they encounter greater
difficulties accessing the labour market (König, Maliepaard, and Güveli 2016). This per-
ception of exclusion may then reinforce the ‘reactive ethnicity’ among minorities (Portes
and Rumbaut 2006, 96) ‒ a preservation of different symbolic markers in order to main-
tain a social identity (in this case a religious identity). This results in a ‘vicious cycle’ of
negative emotions (Agnew and White 1992) and retreatism (Merton 1938). When goals
and status cannot be achieved with the means at hand, one way to cope with this problem
is to seek other ways (e.g. through delinquency) (Martinez 2017) and reject the majority
norms according to the fourth relevant approach –Merton’s (1938) general strain theory.
Youths of immigrant origin sometimes find themselves in such anomic situations where
the (religious) rules that are meant to regulate their lives have lost power. They describe
themselves as religious but they have not always practised their religion in a strict way.
Thus, the relevant mechanisms explaining their stronger engagement in delinquency lie
in perceived exclusion, socio-economic status and victimisation (immigrant children
are more exposed to violence; e.g. Windzio and Baier 2007). In response to their subor-
dinated status, minority youths might cope with their situation by developing higher
levels of subjective religiosity without necessarily having always observed the rules (i.e.
living an abstinent lifestyle), and may circumvent majority norms by engaging in delin-
quency. We deduce our final hypotheses from the theory on reactive ethnicity and strain
theory:
Individuals who are in a deprived situation or perceive to be discriminated against are more
likely to become delinquent (H4: Strain hypothesis). Moreover, we expect highly subjectively
religious individuals without an abstinent lifestyle to be more likely to be delinquent (H5: Reac-
tive hedonism hypothesis).
Previous research (e.g. Baier 2014; Walburg 2014, 199ff.) assumed separate linear effects
of religiosity and hedonism/alcohol consumption on delinquency, particularly violence,
and did not estimate an overlap of categories/interaction effect or create a typology of
believers in multivariate analyses. Jang and Franzen (2013) had a similar idea but
limited their analysis to spirituality and crime among non-Muslims in the US. Given
the emergence of a new profile of perpetrators, we take this idea a step further and
argue that it is not generally religiosity or abstinence, but a combination of these
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factors that foster various forms of delinquency. We examine whether the ones who
describe themselves as religious but have strongly deviated from an abstinent lifestyle
in the past are the ones who are most under threat of delinquency and not the pious
ones as such.
2.3. Other determinants
Other research suggests that the study of the relationship between crime and religiosity
needs to hold potential confounders constant. Differential association theory, promoted
by Sutherland, Cressey, and Luckenbill (1992), also explains the effect of religiosity by
socialisation in peer networks where teens learn their peers’ beliefs and behaviour
(Baier 2014; Pirutinsky 2014, 1291). Recent studies have shown that the composition of
friendship networks of Muslims and Christians varies significantly (Leszczensky and
Pink 2016). We therefore consider a control of peer influences to be important in the
explanation of delinquency.
Following the classical control theoretical approach, the familial network and its
resources will be crucial to consider in addition to peers. Particularly in connection
with immigrant families, scholars have argued that differences in the parental monitoring
can account for ethno-religious differences. There are two ways in which parental moni-
toring might affect ethno-religious differences in delinquency. First, immigrant families
might lack the necessary time and socio-economic resources for parental monitoring
resulting in higher levels of delinquency. Second, there is a higher level of social control
and more authoritarian parenting in immigrant families resulting in less delinquency
(see MacDonald and Saunders 2012 for a review). Including a sample of non-whites, Li
(2014) indeed attests to this prevailing role of parental monitoring in delinquency;
more religious parents monitor their children to a greater extent and are less likely to
have delinquent children.
Lastly, though strongly contested, self-control theory seeks to explain the link
between crime and religiosity with a lack of familial control over impulsivity during
socialisation, and a limited capacity to anticipate long-term consequences (see also
Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990). Reisig, Wolfe, and Pratt (2012) discover criminal
offending to be associated with lower self-control and see religiosity as only an inter-
vening variable. Considering these theories helps us to avoid the fallacy of finding a
spurious relationship (see also Pratt and Cullen 2000) between crime and religiosity,
which in the end could be traced back to general mechanisms as self-control and
neurological aspects as seeking arousal or impulsivity (Cochran 2000). Moreover,
measures of self-control (but also of personal morality and routine activities) are
important explanatory factors for differences between minority and majority group
members (see Kroneberg 2018).
While several studies have extensively investigated the relationship between individual
crime and religiosity, we attempt to reintroduce the contextual level. In contrast to the
aforementioned research, we empirically translate the idea of contextual influences with
more sophisticated methods for a wide range of delinquency indicators. Prior research
using school data has mostly neglected the multi-level structure of data (Wallace et al.
2007). Moreover, our setting is of crucial relevance for current debates on immigration
and integration and shifts the perspective from the US to Europe.
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3. Data, operationalisation and method
3.1. Data
The German data stem from the Schulbefragung 2011 – Lebenslagen und Risiken von
Jugendlichen (School survey 2011 – Circumstances and risks among youths) and were col-
lected between in 2011 and 2012 in Cologne and Mannheim. The response rate among
schools was 64% in Cologne (30 of 47) and 92% (33 of 36) in Mannheim. Students
were in the grades eight to ten. The response rate among students was 80% in Cologne
and 76% in Mannheim (Bühlbecker and Wagner 2015; Oberwittler, Schwarzenbach,
and Gerstner 2014). Vocational schools were excluded from the analyses, as these were
surveyed in Mannheim only. This resulted in 2,820 interviews in Mannheim and 4,128
interviews in Cologne.
The Belgian data ‘Study of opinions and attitudes of young people in Brussels’ were col-
lected in 2007, in secondary schools in seven municipalities, which are representative of
the geographic and demographic diversity of Brussels Region. The response rate of
schools was 88% and of students 70% (Teney 2009). Overall, 3,121 questionnaires were
filled in by students attending the last year of their compulsory secondary education. Stu-
dents were on average 18 years old (median).
Both studies follow a multi-stage sampling in which, in a first step, districts represen-
tative of the socio-demographic composition of the school population were selected. In the
second step, all schools in these districts were sampled. In the third step, a random selec-
tion of classes from these schools took place.2
We refrain from comparing these two samples directly because the age at the last year of
compulsory education in Germany and Belgium differs, but we combine the data for two
reasons. First, this helps us to inquire whether findings hold across European cities that
have experienced a large influx of immigrants. Second, the Belgian data help us to com-
pensate for shortcomings in the operationalisation of religiosity in the German dataset,
which was measured with several items instead of only one, including a measure of reli-
gious affiliation and perceived discrimination.
3.2. Operationalisation
Our dependant variable ‘prevalence of delinquency’ is measured by the means of five
items in Cologne/Mannheim (Germany) and four in Brussels (Belgium), allowing us
to distinguish between vandalism, drug abuse, property offence and victim-involved
violence (additionally cyberbullying in Cologne/Mannheim). Our main independent
variable is religiosity. We have measures of religious salience/subjective/intrinsic religi-
osity available, which is one important factor in measuring religion (Cattelino et al.
2014; Evans et al. 1995; Sinha, Cnaan, and Gelles 2007). Measures of intrinsic religiosity
have an advantage over external forms of religious behaviour because the latter is
subject to social control (Evans et al. 1995, 200). In addition, the German dataset
offers us variables to operationalise our typology. We group individuals of different
faiths into four types along the dimension of subjective religiosity and abstinence
(see Table A1). Among those types are the abstinent areligious, abstinent religious,
non-abstinent areligious and the non-abstinent religious (the ones who describe them-
selves as religious but have strongly deviated from an abstinent lifestyle in the past).
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Alternative estimations using interaction effects between subjective religiosity and absti-
nence produce similar patterns (Table A2 in the appendix).
3.3. Method
We estimate three-level (individual in classes in schools) linear probability mixed-effects
models for Cologne/Mannheim and two-level linear probability models for Brussels (indi-
viduals in schools because information on the class affiliation is not provided)3 with robust
standard errors to account for non-normality in the distribution of our dependent vari-
ables. This allows us to compare our coefficients across models (measures of delinquency)
and groups (Mood 2010). Logistic regressions lead to similar results with regard to our
main independent variables (the only exception is that average religiosity in classes as
operationalisation of the moral community hypothesis is linked to less drug abuse in
Cologne/Mannheim). We use listwise deletion because the results based on chained impu-
tations (m = 10) do not differ for our main variables. In the following descriptive and
multivariate analyses, we show separate tables for Cologne/Mannheim and Brussels.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive findings for youths in Cologne/Mannheim (Germany) and
Brussels (Belgium)
The most frequent form of delinquency in Cologne and Mannheim (Germany) is cyber-
bullying (Table 1). This form of delinquency has received relatively little attention in
earlier research but is expected to gain in importance along with processes of digitalisation.
It is more prevalent among minorities compared to majority youths. A noticeable gap
between majority and minority exists for victim-involved violence, which is more fre-
quently reported by perpetrators belonging to a minority. Minorities, by contrast,
report drug abuse slightly less often (Table 1). For other forms of delinquency, such as
vandalism and property offence, the differences between majority and minority youths
are not always as clear-cut.
The most frequent form of delinquency among Brussels’ youths are drug abuse and
property offences (cyberbullying was not measured) (Table 2). For most forms of delin-
quency, the rates are much lower for minority youths, which becomes particularly
visible in case of drug abuse. However, these findings have little explanatory power, and
they obscure ethno-religious differences due to socio-demographic factors. We therefore
continue with multivariate analyses.
4.2. Multivariate analyses
Controlled for socio-demographic variables, victimisation, peer networks, parental moni-
toring and socio-demographic variables, we observe that religiosity plays a role in
delinquency.
We find overall support for our first hypothesis – the hellfire hypothesis (H1): religious
individuals are less likely to be delinquent (Table 3, Table A3 in the appendix). We find
that this is particularly true for vandalism, property offence and drug abuse (Table 3,
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Models 1–3). Victim-involved violence forms the one important exception in which reli-
gious individuals are more likely to be involved (Table 3, Model 4).
In contrast to the anti-asceticism hypothesis (H2), we do not notice a substantially
steeper slope for drug abuse (Table 3 and Table A3 in the appendix). Sizes of coefficients
are similar and do not differ for students whose parents stem from Muslim-majority
countries or non-Muslim majority countries (not shown), which could be suspected
based on differences in religious observance.4
This brings us to community differences. Following Stark’s (1996) seminal work in this
field, the average level of religiosity in school classes as exogenous indicator of contextual
influences cannot curb the prevalence of delinquency. Thus, we must refute the moral
community hypothesis (H3) in multivariate analyses; on average, classmates that are
more religious do not excel or limit the prevalence of delinquency if individual religiosity
and type of school are controlled for (Table 4).
However, we do observe some denominational differences; Muslim minorities are
overall less likely to become delinquent irrespective of socio-demographic variables, par-
ental monitoring and perceived discrimination (Table 3). Regarding the latter, our
findings fit the strain hypothesis (H4) according to which we expect individuals of deprived
status in terms of perceived discrimination (Table 3), being a victim him/herself and
attending the lowest track of school to be more likely to be delinquent (Table 4).
Groups in such a subordinated position are expected to show higher levels of subjective
religiosity without always sticking to religious rules and abstinence (H5: Reactive hedonism
hypothesis). We therefore investigate the inconsistency between belief and behaviour in the
next step and thereby extend previous research (e.g. Baier 2014). We identify a group of
students who describe themselves as religious but have not always followed an abstinent
lifestyle (i.e. experience of binge drinking in the past) to be more likely to be delinquent
(Table 4, Models 1–4). In additional analyses of the main denomination in the parents’
country of origin in interaction with types of believers, we find that the higher delinquency
applies primarily to students who are religious but not abstinent and whose parents orig-
inate in Muslim-majority countries (Table 5, Models 1–4).
Table 1. Forms of delinquency in Cologne and Mannheim.
Delinquency Vandalism Property offence Drug abuse
Victim-involved
violence Cyber-bullying
Group Majority Minority Majority Minority Majority Minority Majority Minority Majority Minority
Percentage 13.5 13.9 18.5 16.4 13.6 10.6 10.9 17.7 24.9 31.8
n = (100%) 3,386 3,461 3,380 3,461 3,379 3,468 3,374 3,469 3,326 3,388
Source: Compiled by the authors using data from the Survey Lebenslagen und Risiken von Jugendlichen.
Note: The table displays percentages.
Table 2. Forms of delinquency in Brussels.
Delinquency Vandalism Property offence Drug abuse
Victim-involved
violence
Group Majority Minority Majority Minority Majority Minority Majority Minority
Percentage 20.4 15.2 31.2 22.5 40.5 24.2 23.0 23.1
n = (100%) 1,269 1,682 1,271 1,682 1,271 1,679 1,264 1,679
Source: Compiled by the authors using data from the ‘Study of opinions and attitudes of young people in Brussels’.
Note: The table displays percentages.
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Our analyses are novel, and they help us to illustrate that our findings are robust across
contexts in three ways: First, the role of religiosity holds for different forms of delinquency.
Whereas religiosity seems to go along with lower levels of delinquency, we find in Brussels
and in the German cities Cologne and Mannheim the opposite for victim-involved vio-
lence as religiosity is linked to higher levels of victim-involved violence there. Second,
the role of religiosity remains stable using a more fine-grained measure of religiosity.
Thus, we can conclude that our simple measure of self-rated religiosity in Cologne/Man-
nheim is a good predictor for delinquency. Moreover, the Belgian dataset contains infor-
mation about the religious affiliations. We can unearth an overall lower likelihood of
delinquency among Muslim minorities compared to Atheists (Table 3). Third and
finally, findings on the role of religiosity do not seem to depend on the city in this case.
4.3. Robustness checks
As the role of religiosity differed depending on whether the dependent variable was preva-
lence (delinquency yes/no) or incidence (the frequency of delinquent acts) in previous
studies, we estimated alternative models using the incidence of delinquency types in the
Table 3. Linear probability model of delinquency in Brussels.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Vandalism Property offence Drug abuse Victim-involved violence
Religiosity −0.017** −0.021* −0.053*** 0.016*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Atheist (ref.)
Christian −0.017 −0.054** −0.071** −0.012
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Muslim −0.046+ −0.166*** −0.166*** −0.087**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Other −0.070* −0.104* 0.045 −0.011
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
Discrimination & parental influence
Perceived discrimination 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.029** 0.047***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Parental Control −0.084*** −0.087*** −0.128*** −0.081***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Socio-demographics
Female (ref. male) −0.136*** −0.029 −0.073*** −0.191***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age −0.011 −0.017+ 0.009 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
High education (ref.)
Middle Education 0.030 0.030 0.066** 0.104***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Low Education 0.017 0.049 0.106*** 0.105**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
High status (ref.)
Low Status −0.058** −0.028 −0.063** −0.012
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Middle Status −0.010 −0.033* −0.016 0.033+
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 0.764*** 0.957*** 0.800*** 0.487*
(0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19)
Observations 2547 2552 2545 2547
AIC 1908.672 2787.551 2875.081 2465.190
Source: Compiled by the authors using data from the ‘Study of opinions and attitudes of young people in Brussels’.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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Table 4. Linear probability model of delinquency in Cologne/Mannheim.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vandalism
Property
offence
Drug
abuse
Victim-involved
violence Bullying
Religiosity
Abstinent religious (ref.)
Abstinent areligious 0.005 0.007 −0.001 −0.019* 0.015
(0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014)
Non-abstinent areligious 0.094*** 0.130*** 0.224*** −0.012 0.072***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.020)
Non-abstinent religious 0.085*** 0.064*** 0.115*** 0.068** 0.011
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.020)
Average class religiosity −0.006 0.004 −0.012 0.007 0.012
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014)
Parental influence & personality
Parental monitoring −0.019* −0.029*** −0.006 −0.011 −0.021*
(0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009)
Parental beating 0.028*** 0.028** 0.008 0.011 0.015
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.011)
Self-control 0.083*** 0.052*** 0.033*** 0.075*** 0.084***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Peers
Friends vandalise 0.206***
(0.012)
Friends steal 0.302***
(0.014)
Friends do drugs 0.298***
(0.013)
Victim of violence 0.156***
(0.018)
Friends violent 0.272***
(0.016)
Victim of bullying 0.312***
(0.013)
Friends are bullies 0.321***
(0.014)
Socio-demographics
Female (ref. male) −0.035*** 0.001 −0.018* −0.087*** −0.027*
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
Age −0.007 0.004 0.011** −0.005 −0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Cologne 0.009 0.026* 0.016* 0.002 0.012
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
Parental education
no degree (ref.)
Lower sec. school I, no access to general
education
0.002 −0.012 −0.005 −0.003 −0.044
(0.023) (0.022) (0.015) (0.025) (0.027)
Lower sec. school II, access to general
education
0.005 0.007 −0.003 0.017 −0.014
(0.022) (0.026) (0.015) (0.026) (0.028)
Upper sec. school −0.005 0.011 0.015 −0.005 −0.044
(0.027) (0.024) (0.016) (0.026) (0.029)
University −0.014 −0.010 0.019 −0.010 −0.043
(0.026) (0.024) (0.014) (0.026) (0.030)
Students’ school type
Upper secondary school (Gymnasium)
(ref.)
Comprehensive school −0.011 0.009 0.008 −0.020 0.044*
(0.021) (0.019) (0.014) (0.024) (0.020)
Lower secondary school II (Realschule) 0.002 −0.003 0.012 −0.006 0.025*
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Lower secondary school I (Hauptschule) 0.007 0.046** 0.005 0.036* 0.010
(0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017) (0.020)
0.018+ 0.026* −0.012 −0.022* 0.019+
(Continued )
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past twelve months as our dependent variables. Since these variables are heavily skewed,
we estimated two-level mixed-effects negative binomial regressions. In the data from
Cologne and Mannheim, students are nested in classes and in the data from Brussels, stu-
dents are nested in schools because class affiliation was not assessed. The results for our
main independent variables remain stable (Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix). In
addition, we reveal that the moral community hypothesis applies to the case of incidence.
If the average level of religiosity increases in German classes by one unit, the likelihood of
delinquent acts decreases (Table A4 in the appendix). Thus, we can conclude that classes
with a higher average level of religiosity do not prevent the occurrence of delinquency but
they might keep the incidences within limits.5
Moreover, our approach of combining subjective religiosity and abstinence also triggers
the question of whether subjective religiosity or abstinence are more important. We
observe that religiosity is of varying importance for delinquency. In terms of effect size,
abstinence is more important in the explanation of vandalism, property offence and
drug abuse but the beta coefficients are of nearly equal size with regard to victim-involved
violence and bullying (see Table A3 in the appendix), which suggests that it is indeed a
Table 4. Continued.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vandalism
Property
offence
Drug
abuse
Victim-involved
violence Bullying
Lower secondary school (Haupt-/
Realschule)
(0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Waldorf school −0.047*** −0.025* −0.001 0.019+ 0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Ethnic origin
German (ref.)
Turkish 0.007 −0.055*** 0.005 0.036** 0.050**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018)
South European −0.003 0.011 0.013 −0.009 0.052*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.021) (0.026)
Russian/ex-Soviet −0.035+ 0.016 −0.044** −0.003 0.060*
(0.020) (0.034) (0.014) (0.028) (0.030)
Ex-Yugoslav/Albanian −0.020 0.036 −0.010 0.048+ 0.041
(0.021) (0.030) (0.016) (0.028) (0.032)
Polish −0.001 −0.023 0.007 −0.025 0.017
(0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.021) (0.027)
Eastern European (other) 0.017 −0.008 −0.035 −0.067* 0.016
(0.029) (0.038) (0.024) (0.034) (0.032)
Arab/North African/Islamic Asian −0.039+ −0.056* 0.000 0.010 0.012
(0.021) (0.025) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
Sub-Saharan African −0.028 −0.003 −0.032 0.037 0.033
(0.037) (0.044) (0.031) (0.035) (0.042)
other ethnicity −0.014 −0.041 −0.070* 0.024 0.038
(0.044) (0.046) (0.029) (0.051) (0.062)
Central/East Asian −0.009 −0.015 0.005 0.011 0.012
(0.042) (0.048) (0.029) (0.037) (0.044)
Latin American 0.013 0.096+ 0.129* 0.028 0.015
(0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.059) (0.046)
Western European/North American/
Australian
0.044 0.076** 0.039 0.019 0.024
(0.031) (0.025) (0.027) (0.023) (0.036)
Constant 0.002 −0.104 −0.220** 0.011 −0.003
(0.102) (0.087) (0.072) (0.079) (0.104)
Observations 5304 5298 5293 5236 5147
AIC 2497.978 3195.052 792.433 1932.190 4302.733
Source: Compiled by the authors using data from the Survey Lebenslagen und R. von Jugendlichen.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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combination of belief and practice for this type of delinquency. However, we would like to
emphasise that our estimates are conservative due to an inclusion of several control vari-
ables (e.g. perceived discrimination, parental control) that might differ across religious and
non-religious youths. Yet, coefficients for religiosity do not change noticeably if we exclude
the variables mentioned above (not shown).
4.4. Delinquency and socio-demographic influences
In addition to religion, we estimated ethnic differences. Although ethnic minorities are less
likely to be delinquent in most instances, there are exceptions – most prominently in bul-
lying and to some extent in victim-involved violence (Table 4). Previous research has
already shown that minorities of deprived background are more likely to be bullies (e.g.
Sykes, Piquero, and Gioviano 2016). Holding the demographic variables and religious
types constant, North African and Arab youths are no more likely than majority youths
to be delinquent, and they are less likely to be involved in vandalism and property
offences (Table 4).
Our findings are robust to influences of socio-economic status. Parental education does
not significantly explain delinquency.6 Variation across school types is also not systematic
but we see a tendency of students attending lower secondary schools to be more likely to
commit property offence and victim-involved violence (Table 4, Model 2 and 4). In
additional analyses (available upon request), we also included a control for parental unem-
ployment and living on social benefits (this was excluded in the main analyses due to a
dropping sample size). Although parental unemployment and living on social benefits
influenced students’ likelihood of committing property offence and victim-involved vio-
lence significantly, it did not explain drug abuse, vandalism and bullying, or alter our
Table 5. Delinquency and Religiosity depending on country of origin (Cologne/ Mannheim).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vandalism Property offence Drug abuse Victim-involved violence Bullying
(partly) Muslim-majority country
Abstinent religious (ref.)
Abstinent areligious 0.043+ 0.054* −0.003 −0.031* 0.023
(0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.016) (0.030)
Non-abstinent areligious 0.118** 0.198*** 0.213*** 0.019 0.022
(0.039) (0.054) (0.038) (0.037) (0.046)
Non-abstinent religious 0.131*** 0.075** 0.126*** 0.126*** −0.002
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.027)
non-Muslim country
Abstinent religious 0.039** 0.069*** 0.007 −0.018 −0.035*
(0.015) (0.013) (0.007) (0.014) (0.017)
Abstinent areligious −0.058* −0.060* −0.000 0.008 −0.010
(0.025) (0.024) (0.015) (0.019) (0.034)
Non-abstinent areligious −0.042 −0.082 0.011 −0.041 0.053
(0.043) (0.060) (0.041) (0.039) (0.049)
Non-abstinent religious −0.087* −0.016 −0.020 −0.097** 0.022
(0.040) (0.038) (0.037) (0.031) (0.035)
Constant −0.032 −0.167+ −0.223** 0.032 0.025
(0.106) (0.089) (0.073) (0.081) (0.105)
Observations 5304 5298 5293 5236 5147
AIC 2484.595 3198.543 803.295 1911.344 4294.431
Source: Compiled by the authors using data from the Survey Lebenslagen und R. von Jugendlichen. Note: Robust standard
errors in parentheses, +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
14 S. CAROL ET AL.
core variables. The number of siblings and parental separation were mostly not of signifi-
cance. They also did not alter the results for our main variables.
Besides socio-economic differences, we observe gender differences. Girls are nearly
always less likely to be delinquent (except in terms of property offence in Brussels,
Table 3). In an additional analyses, we interacted gender with our main variables of inter-
est (available on request). While the relationship between religiosity and delinquency is
not different for boys and girls in Brussels (except for vandalism where the association
with religiosity is close to zero for girls), we see that the patterns observed for Cologne/
Mannheim hold for boys but not for girls. This is most visible in case of victim-involved
violence. No matter of which type (religious and/or abstinent), girls are almost always less
violent than abstinent religious boys (except for abstinent areligious girls). Non-abstinent
religious girls are also less likely to vandalise, which is the opposite of boys. Given previous
research on gender differences and the role of masculinity norms (Baier 2014; Windzio
and Baier 2007), these findings do not come as a surprise.
5. Conclusion
This paper set out to scrutinise the relationship between delinquency and religiosity
among European youths. Our analyses generate an interesting insight into the study of
delinquency and the role of religiosity. They demonstrate that we need to refine the
hellfire hypothesis, which is reflected in a reduced delinquency due to the fear of hell.
We also need to go beyond Burkett’s and White’s (1974) extension of the hellfire-hypoth-
esis to the anti-asceticism hypothesis, stating a stronger relationship between substance use
and religiosity. In fact, the role of subjective religiosity in delinquency is trumped by the
behavioural indicator of religiosity – abstinence – in case of vandalism, property offence
and drug abuse, while it can play an equal role in explaining victim-involved violence
and bullying. This is surprising and speaks against the anti-asceticism hypothesis.
We refine previous research by unearthing how subjective religiosity intertwined with
abstinence from binge drinking relates to delinquency. We distinguish the empirically
often-overlooked types of religious individuals: (I.) abstinent non-believers, (II.) abstinent
believers, (III.) non-abstinent non-believers and (IV.) non-abstinent believers. We are able
to show that believers who do not abstain from binge drinking are more likely to be delin-
quent than the pious, which is in line with our reactive hedonism hypothesis. This pattern is
more pronounced among youths whose parents stem from Muslim-majority countries.
Yet, this does not warrant the conclusion that Muslim minorities are more likely to be
delinquent. Overall, they are less likely to be delinquent. Primarily a group that identifies
with a religion but does not necessarily follow certain rules of that religion (perhaps out of
an urge to compensate for their lifestyle) is more likely to be delinquent. We also discuss
explanations based on other measures of strain. Our findings suggest that a feeling of dis-
crimination and attendance of the lowest tracks in schools are characteristic for delinquent
youths. We expected those who are most vulnerable in terms of low social status, victimi-
sation and exclusion to be more likely to be delinquent in order to achieve status with
alternative means (strain hypothesis).
The moral community operationalised through the average level of religiosity in classes
might have a protective function as the incidences (frequency) of delinquency are lower in
more religious classes but it does not alter the prevalence (being delinquent or not).
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Although we were able to draw on various measures of delinquency there is room for
improvement. Ideally, we would have had a greater set of indicators of religiosity available,
in particular of religious abstinence and observance. Yet a larger number of other items
would be at the expense of a wide set of delinquency measures. Future research should
also try to disentangle religiosity from spirituality. In addition, social desirability in the
reporting of delinquent acts always attracts potential criticism. However, this does not
overshadow our findings for three reasons: First, our interest lies not in drawing con-
clusions about the distribution of delinquency, but only in investigating relationships.
Second, it has been shown that the student responses were more honest when data
were collected in classes rather than at home. Third, police records do not necessarily
provide a better alternative because some delinquent acts stay undiscovered and would
leave these underestimated in official statistics (Köllisch and Oberwittler 2004; Wikström
et al. 2013). Finally, an important limitation concerns the question of causality. Data col-
lected over the life-course would be helpful in determining the pathways into delinquency.
Previous research has shown a plurality of pathways into delinquency. While for some
non-abstinence is an expression of a general difficulty with the observation of rules and
self-control, for others it triggers aggression (Raskin White 2014). Similarly, life-course
data would be desirable to observe reactive religiosity. In any case, the results plead for
conditional views on the relationship between delinquency and religiosity to illuminate
the heterogeneity within the group of delinquents.
Despite any potential shortcomings, the merits of this study lie in the comparatively
large dataset, the simultaneous investigation of a vast range of delinquency indicators
and their cross-context validation including two hotspots with a recent crime history.
We thereby refine valuable previous research, which concluded that religion, in particular
Islam, can be linked to higher levels of violence (e.g. Baier 2014). We reveal that ‘trouble-
makers’ from Muslim-majority countries are not religious in the proper sense. Instead,
some have binge drinking experience. Thus, it is not primarily about religion, immigrant
origin or abstinence alone but a combination of these attributes (heterogeneity within the
group of abstinent and religious). In relative terms, the group of violent youths to which
these attributes apply is negligible, which should also be kept in mind discussing the events
of New Year’s Eve. Moreover, violence can also target in-group members (Wittek, Krone-
berg and Lämmermann 2019). Nevertheless, past terrorist incidents have taught us that
the retreat into communities with competing moral orders and hate preaching are a
harbour for particularly the subjectively religious and previously non-abstinent violent
youths. Our study should warrant our understanding of delinquency in immigrant and
native communities.
It also contributes to the current debate on the relationship between integration
and religion, which condemns religion either as a barrier or praises it as a bridge to inte-
gration (see Kogan, Fong, and Reitz 2019). In Europe, religion has been revealed a barrier
to social and cultural integration (e.g. Carol 2016) as well as structural integration (e.g.
Khoudja and Fleischmann 2015) but as a bridge to political engagement (e.g. Teney
and Hanquinet 2012). Our results reveal the complexity of this relationship, pointing
out the need to move away from linear predictions to typology-based approaches,
which do not lump religious individuals in one category. There is no uniform relationship
with religiosity in the field of delinquency, which would allow us to conclude that religion
is a barrier or bridge per se.
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Notes
1. https://www.mannheim.de/de/stadt-gestalten/daten-und-fakten/bevoelkerung/einwohner-mit-
migrationshintergrund, 09.05.2018.
2. Access to the datasets were available on request from Michael Wagner (University of
Cologne) and Céline Teney (University of Göttingen).
3. Overall, the variation on the levels of classes and schools differs strongly by type of delin-
quency. While the variation on the class and school level is in logistic mixed-effects
models altogether below 10% in case of vandalism, property offence and about 5% in case
of bullying, 18% lie on the class level in case of drug abuse (6% on the school level) and
13% on the school level in case of violence (3% on the class level). We decided to cluster
because the assumption that errors are fully uncorrelated is violated. Second, this is rec-
ommended if some clusters in the population are not covered due to a clustered sampling
strategy.
4. In the Belgian data, the coefficients for Catholic and Muslim students are not significantly
different from each other. The only exception is the relationship with drug abuse, which is
more negative for Catholics.
5. Our findings on incidences of delinquency remain relatively stable if we exclude students who
have been delinquent at some point in the past but do not indicate any acts in the past twelve
months and are more likely to be a group of students where the causality between religiosity
and delinquency is reversed, i.e. they have become more religious to seek forgiveness for their
‘sinful’ behaviour in the past.
6. The simultaneous inclusion of parental education and students’ school type does not affect
the findings.
Acknowledgements
We gratefully acknowledge Céline Teney and the Université libre de Bruxelles for the provision of
the Belgian data. We would also like to thank Mark Wittek for the data preparation, Clemens Kro-
neberg and associated members of the chair of Sociology I (University of Cologne) for helpful com-
ments on a previous draft of this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
References
Abu-Rayya, Hisham M., Shayma Almoty, Fiona A. White, and Maram H. Abu-Rayya. 2016. “The
Interconnection between Islamic Religiosity and Deviancy Among Australian Muslim Youth: A
Partial Mediation Role of Life Satisfaction.” The International Journal for the Psychology of
Religion 26 (4): 337–347.
Adamczyk, Amy. 2012. “Understanding Delinquency with Friendship Group Religious Context*:
Delinquency with Friendship Group Religious Context.” Social Science Quarterly 93 (2):
482–505.
Adamczyk, Amy, Joshua D. Freilich, and Chunrye Kim. 2017. “Religion and Crime: A Systematic
Review and Assessment of Next Steps.” Sociology of Religion 78 (2): 192–232.
Agnew, Robert, and Helene Raskin White. 1992. “An Empirical Test of General Strain Theory.”
Criminology; An interdisciplinary Journal 30 (4): 475–499.
Alba, Richard, Jennifer Sloan, and Jessica Sperling. 2011. “The Integration Imperative: The Children
of Low-Status Immigrants in the Schools of Wealthy Societies.” Annual Review of Sociology 37
(1): 395–415.
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 17
Bade, Klaus J., and Jochen Oltmer. 2007. “Deutschland.” In Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa.
Vom 17. Jahrhundert Bis Zur Gegenwart, edited by Klaus J. Bade, Pieter Emmer, Leo
Lucassen, and Jochen Oltmer, 141–170. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh.
Baier, Dirk. 2014. “The Influence of Religiosity on Violent Behavior of Adolescents: A Comparison
of Christian and Muslim Religiosity.” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 29 (1): 102–127.
Baier, Dirk, Christian Pfeiffer, Susann Rabold, Julia Simonson, and Cathleen Kappes. 2010. Kinder
Und Jugendliche in Deutschland. Gewalterfahrungen, Integration Und Medienkonsum.
Hannover: Forschungsbericht Nr.109.
Baier, Colin J., and Bradley R.E. Wright. 2001. “‘If You Love Me, Keep My Commandments’: A
Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Religion on Crime.” Journal of Research in Crime and
Delinquency 38 (1): 3–21.
Brettfeld, Katrin, and Peter Wetzels. 2011. “Religionszugehörigkeit, Religiosität Und Delinquentes
Verhalten Jugendlicher.”Monatsschrift Für Kriminologie Und Strafrechtsreform 94 (6): 409–430.
Bühlbecker, Lena, and Michael Wagner. 2015. Lebenslagen Und Risiken von Jugendlichen: Eine
Projektdokumentation Zur Schulbefragung 2011. Cologne: University of Cologne. http://www.
iss-wiso.uni-koeln.de/sites/soziologie/pdf/Forschungsprojekte/Forschungsdokumentation.pdf.
Burkett, Steven R., and Mervin White. 1974. “Hellfire and Delinquency: Another Look.” Journal for
the Scientific Study of Religion 13 (4): 455–462.
Burt, Callie Harbin, Ronald L. Simons, and Frederick X. Gibbons. 2012. “Racial Discrimination,
Ethnic-Racial Socialization, and Crime: A Micro-Sociological Model of Risk and Resilience.”
American Sociological Review 77 (4): 648–677.
Carol, Sarah. 2016. Social Integration and Intermarriage in Europe: Islam, Partner-Choices and
Parental Influence. Research in Migration and Ethnic Relations Series. New York: Routledge.
Cattelino, Elena, Fabienne Glowacz, Michel Born, Silvia Testa, Manuela Bina, and Emanuela
Calandri. 2014. “Adolescent Risk Behaviours and Protective Factors Against Peer Influence.”
Journal of Adolescence 37 (8): 1353–1362.
Cochran, John K. 2000. “Religion and Deviance.” In Encyclopedia of Criminology and Deviant
Behaviour, edited by Clifton D. Bryant, vol. 1, 321–324. Philadelphia: Routledge.
Cochran, John K., and Ronald L. Akers. 1989. “Beyond Hellfire: An Exploration of the Variable
Effects of Religiosity on Adolescent Marijuana and Alcohol Use.” Journal of Research in Crime
and Delinquency 26 (3): 198–225.
Deboosere, Patrick, Thierry Eggerickx, Etienne Van Hecke, and Benjamin Wayens. 2009. “The
Population of Brussels: A Demographic Overview.” Brussels Studies (EGB3) 3): 1–17. doi:10.
4000/brussels.891.
Diehl, Claudia, and Matthias König. 2009. “Religiosität Türkischer Migranten Im
Generationenverlauf: Ein Befund Und Einige Erklärungsversuche.” Zeitschrift Für Soziologie
38 (4): 300–319.
Durkheim, Emile. 2014. Der Selbstmord. Translated by Sebastian Herkommer and Hanne
Herkommer. 13. Auflage. Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 431. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp.
Evans, T. David, Francis T. Cullen, R. Gregory Dunaway, and Velmer S. Burton, Jr. 1995. “Religion
and Crime Reexamined: The Impact of Religion, Secular Controls, and Social Ecology on Adult
Criminality.” Criminology; An interdisciplinary Journal 33 (2): 195–224.
Foner, Nancy, and Richard Alba. 2008. “Immigrant Religion in the U.S. and Western Europe:
Bridge or Barrier to Inclusion?” International Migration Review 42 (2): 360–392.
Fyffe, Steve. 2016. “Brussels Suicide Attacks ‘Shocking but Not Surprising,’ Stanford Experts Say.”
Stanford University News, March 25. http://news.stanford.edu/2016/03/25/brussels-cisac-
experts-032516/.
Gottfredson, Michael R., and Travis Hirschi. 1990. A General Theory of Crime. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Hennen, Claudia. 2016. “Ein Halbes Jahr Nach Silvester.” TAZ, July 10. http://www.taz.de/!
5317184/.
Hirschi, Travis, and Rodney Stark. 1969. “Hellfire and Delinquency.” Social Problems 17 (2):
202–213.
18 S. CAROL ET AL.
Hopkins, Steven. 2015. “Paris Terrorist Smoked ‘Alarming Amount Of Cannabis’, Drank Alcohol,
And Never Went To A Mosque, Ex-Wife Claims.” The Huffington Post, November 18. http://
www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/11/18/paris-terrorist-smoked-alarming-amount-of-cannabis_
n_8589508.html.
Jang, Sung Joon, and Aaron B. Franzen. 2013. “Is Being ‘Spiritual’ Enough Without Being
Religious? A Study of Violent and Property Crimes among Emerging Adults.” Criminology;
An interdisciplinary Journal 51 (3): 595–627.
Jenness, Valerie, and Philip Goodman. 2006. The Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology. Edited by
Bryan S. Turner. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kanol, Eylem. Forthcoming. Jihadi Radicalization in Europe from a Comparative Perspective:
Profiles, Contexts, Networks and Narratives. Berlin: Humboldt Universität zu Berlin.
Kemme, Stefanie, and Jan Hendrik Kolberg. 2013. “Religiosität Und Delinquenz Bei Einheimischen
Muslimen Und Christen: Welche Rolle Spielt Die Geschlechtsrollenorientierung?” Zeitschrift Für
Jugendkriminalität Und Jugendhilfe 1: 4–12.
Khoudja, Yassine, and Fenella Fleischmann. 2015. “Ethnic Differences in Female Labour Force
Participation in the Netherlands: Adding Gender Role Attitudes and Religiosity to the
Explanation.” European Sociological Review 31 (1): 91–102.
Kiefer, Michael, Jörg Hüttermann, Bacem Dziri, Rauf Ceylan, Viktoria Roth, Fabian Srowig, and
Andreas Zick. 2017. “Lasset uns in shaʿa Allah ein Plan machen”: fallgestützte Analyse der
Radikalisierung einer WhatsApp-Gruppe. Islam in der Gesellschaft. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
Klask, Fabian. 2016. “Silvesternacht Innenminister Vor Sexueller Gewalt Gewarnt – Kahlen
Widerspricht Reker.” Kölner Stadtanzeiger, September 1. https://www.ksta.de/koeln/
silvesternacht-innenminister-vor-sexueller-gewalt-gewarnt—kahlen-widerspricht-reker-24681128.
Kogan, I., E. Fong, and J. G. Reitz. 2019. “Religion and Integration among Immigrant and Minority
Youth.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. doi:10.1080/1369183X.2019.1620408.
Köllisch, Tilman, and Dietrich Oberwittler. 2004. “How Honestly Do Male Adolescents Report
Their Delinquent Behaviour?” KZfSS Kölner Zeitschrift Für Soziologie Und Sozialpsychologie
56 (4): 708–735.
König, Matthias, Mieke Maliepaard, and Ayse Güveli. 2016. “Religion and New Immigrants’ Labor
Market Entry in Western Europe.” Ethnicities 16 (2): 213–235.
Kroneberg, Clemens. 2018. “Reconsidering the Immigration-Crime Nexus in Europe: Ethnic
Differences in Juvenile Delinquency.” In Growing up in Diverse Europe: The Integration of
Children of Immigrants in England, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, edited by Frank
Kalter, Jan O. Jonsson, Anthony F. Heath, and Frank van Tubergen, 335–368. Oxford:
Proceedings of the British Academy.
Lamnek, Siegfried. 2007. Theorien Abweichenden Verhaltens I: “Klassische” Ansätze. 8th ed.
Paderborn: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.
Laurence, Jonathan. 2012. The Emancipation of Europe’s Muslims: The State’s Role in Minority
Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Leszczensky, Lars, and Sebastian Pink. 2016. “Intra- and Inter-Group Friendship Choices of
Christian, Muslim, and Non-Religious Youth in Germany.” European Sociological Review 33
(1): 72–83.
Li, Spencer D. 2014. “Familial Religiosity, Family Processes, and Juvenile Delinquency in a National
Sample of Early Adolescents.” The Journal of Early Adolescence 34 (4): 436–462.
Lutz, Martin, and Constanze Reuscher. 2017. “Anis Amri Nahm Regelmäßig Ecstasy Und Kokain.”
Die Welt, January 15. https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article161179412/Anis-Amri-
nahm-regelmaessig-Ecstasy-und-Kokain.html.
MacDonald, John, and Jessica Saunders. 2012. “Are Immigrant Youth Less Violent? Specifying the
Reasons and Mechanisms.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 641 (1): 125–147.
Martinez, Brandon C. 2017. “General Strain Theory, Religiosity, and Delinquency among Young
Latino Americans.” Deviant Behavior 38 (11): 1223–1239.
Merton, Robert K. 1938. “Social Structure and Anomie.” American Sociological Review 3 (5):
672–682.
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 19
Michalak, Laurence, and Karen Trocki. 2006. “Alcohol and Islam: An Overview.” Contemporary
Drug Problems 33 (4): 523–562.
Ministerium für Arbeit, Integration und Soziales des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. 2016.
Integrationsprofil Köln. Daten Zu Zuwanderung Und Integration. Düsseldorf. http://www.
integrationsmonitoring.nrw.de/integrationsberichterstattung_nrw/Integration_kommunal/
Integrationsprofile/Integrationsprofile—Koeln.pdf.
Mood, Carina. 2010. “Logistic Regression: Why We Cannot Do What We Think We Can Do, and
What We Can Do About It.” European Sociological Review 26 (1): 67–82.
Norris, Pippa, and Ronald F. Inglehart. 2012. “Muslim Integration into Western Cultures: Between
Origins and Destinations.” Political Studies 60 (2): 228–251.
Oberwittler, Dietrich, Anina Schwarzenbach, and Dominik Gerstner. 2014. Polizei und Jugendliche
in multiethnischen Gesellschaften: Ergebnisse der Schulbefragung 2011 “Lebenslagen und Risiken
von Jugendlichen” in Köln und Mannheim. Forschung aktuell 47. Freiburg im Breisgau: Max-
Planck-Inst. für Ausländisches und Internat. Strafrecht.
Palmisano, Joseph M., ed. 2001. World of Sociology. Vol. 2. Detroit: Gale Group.
Pearce, Lisa D., and Dana L. Haynie. 2004. “Intergenerational Religious Dynamics and Adolescent
Delinquency.” Social Forces 82 (4): 1553–1572.
Pirutinsky, Steven. 2014. “Does Religiousness Increase Self-Control and Reduce Criminal
Behavior?: A Longitudinal Analysis of Adolescent Offenders.” Criminal Justice and Behavior
41 (11): 1290–1307.
Polizei Köln. 2016. “POL-K: 160109-3-K Übergriffe Am Kölner Hauptbahnhof - Aktueller
Ermittlungsstand.” Presseportal.De. http://www.presseportal.de/blaulicht/pm/12415/3220633.
Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 2006. Immigrant America: A Portrait. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Pratt, Travis C., and Francis T. Cullen. 2000. “The Empirical Status of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s
General Theory of Crime: A Meta-Analysis.” Criminology; An interdisciplinary Journal 38 (3):
931–964.
Raskin White, Helena. 2014. “Substance Use and Crime.” In The Oxford Handbook of Substance
Use and Substance Use Disorders, edited by Kenneth J. Sher, 347–378. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Regnerus, Mark D. 2003. “Moral Communities and Adolescent Delinquency: Religious Contexts
and Community Social Control.” The Sociological Quarterly 44 (4): 523–554.
Reisig, Michael D., Scott E. Wolfe, and Travis C. Pratt. 2012. “Low Self-Control and the Religiosity-
Crime Relationship.” Criminal Justice and Behavior 39 (9): 1172–1191.
Salas-Wright, Christopher P., Michael G. Vaughn, David R. Hodge, and Brian E. Perron. 2012.
“Religiosity Profiles of American Youth in Relation to Substance Use, Violence, and
Delinquency.” Journal of Youth and Adolescence 41 (12): 1560–1575.
Sander, William. 2010. “Religious Background and Educational Attainment: The Effects of
Buddhism, Islam, and Judaism.” Economics of Education Review 29 (3): 489–493.
Scott, John, and Gordon Marshall, eds. 2005. A Dictionary of Sociology. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Sinha, Jill W., Ram A. Cnaan, and Richard J. Gelles. 2007. “Adolescent Risk Behaviors and Religion:
Findings from a National Study.” Journal of Adolescence 30 (2): 231–249.
Smith, Gregory. 2015. America’s Changing Religious Landscape. Washington, DC: PEW Research
Center.
Sniderman, Paul M., and Louk Hagendoorn. 2007.WhenWays of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and
Its Discontents in the Netherlands. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Staatskanzlei, N. R. W. 2016. “Silvesternacht in Köln | Das Landesportal Wir in NRW.” https://
www.land.nrw/de/silvesternacht-koeln-landesregierung-traegt-konsequent-zur-transparenten-
aufarbeitung-der-ereignisse.
Stark, Rodney. 1996. “Religion as Context: Hellfire and Delinquency One More Time.” Sociology of
Religion 57 (2): 163–173.
Stark, Rodney, Lori Kent, and Daniel P. Doyle. 1982. “Religion and Delinquency: The Ecology of a
‘Lost’ Relationship.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 19 (1): 4–24.
20 S. CAROL ET AL.
Sutherland, Edwin Hardin, Donald Ray Cressey, and David F. Luckenbill. 1992. Principles of
Criminology. 11th ed. New York: General Hall.
Sykes, Bryan L., Alex R. Piquero, and Jason P. Gioviano. 2016. “Code of the Classroom? Social
Disadvantage and Bullying Among American Adolescents, U.S. 2011-2012.” Crime &
Delinquency 63 (14): 1883–1922.
Teney, Céline. 2009. Acculturation and Prejudice against Sociological Minorities among Brussels
Youth. A Multilevel Regression Approach. Brussels: Université Libre de Bruxelles.
Teney, Céline, and Laurie Hanquinet. 2012. “High Political Participation, High Social Capital? A
Relational Analysis of Youth Social Capital and Political Participation.” Social Science
Research 41 (5): 1213–1226.
Tonry, Michael. 1997. “Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration.” In Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration:
Comparative and Cross Research Perspective, edited by Michael Tonry, 1–29. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Walburg, Christian. 2014. Migration Und Jugenddelinquenz: Eine Analyse Anhand Eines
Sozialstrukturellen Delinquenzmodells. Kriminologie Und Kriminalsoziologie, Band 11.
Münster: Waxmann.
Wallace, John M., Ryoko Yamaguchi, Jerald G. Bachman, Patrick M. O’Malley, John E.
Schulenberg, and Lloyd D. Johnston. 2007. “Religiosity and Adolescent Substance Use: The
Role of Individual and Contextual Influences.” Social Problems 54 (2): 308–327.
Welch, Michael R., Charles R. Tittle, and Thomas Petee. 1991. “Religion and Deviance among Adult
Catholics: A Test of the ‘Moral Communities’ Hypothesis.” Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion 30 (2): 159–172.
Wikström, Per-Olof H., Dietrich Oberwittler, Kyle Treiber, and Beth Hardie. 2013. Breaking Rules:
The Social and Situational Dynamics of Young People’s Urban Crime. Clarendon Studies in
Criminology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williams, Franklin P., and Marilyn D. McShane. 2003. Encyclopedia of Juvenile Justice. Thousand
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc.
Windzio, Michael, and Dirk Baier. 2007. “Soziale Netzwerke, Persönlichkeit Und Jugendgewalt in
Der Multi-Ethnischen Gesellschaft: Wie Einflussreich Ist Die Informelle Soziale Kontrolle
Gegenüber Der “KuItur Der Ehre” Und Der Selbstkontrolle?” In Soziale Netzwerke Und
Soziale Ungleichheit: Zur Rolle von Sozialkapital in Modernen Gesellschaften, edited by Jörg
Lüdicke, and Martin Diewald, 163–200. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
Wirtz, Astrid. 2016. “Terror Ist Eine Todsünde Im Islam.” Frankfurter Rundschau, March 30.
http://www.fr.de/politik/zentralrat-der-muslime-terror-ist-eine-todsuende-im-islam-a-359209.
Wittek, Mark, Clemens Kroneberg, and Kathrin Lämmermann. 2019. “Who is Fighting With
Whom? How Ethnic origin Shapes Friendship, Dislike, and Physical Violence Relations in
German Secondary Schools.” Social Networks. doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2019.04.004.
Zeit. 2016. “Kölner Muslime Beklagen ‘Neue Dimension Des Hasses.’” Zeit Online, January 11. http://
www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2016-01/silvester-uebergriffe-koeln-muslime-fremdenhass.
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 21
Appendix
Table A1. Operationalisation.
Cologne and Mannheim (Germany)
Variables Items Scale
Mean
(SD)/% n
Dependent
variables
Most people, at some point in their life,
sometimes do things which are prohibited, for
example ride the bus without having a ticket
or stealing something. Have you already done
anything forbidden?
0 (no), 1 (yes)
Vandalism ‘ … deliberately destroyed something in school,
parks, telephone boxes, metro’.
14% 943
Property offences ‘ … stole something in a shop’. 17% 1,199
Drug abuse ‘ … took drugs (marihuana, ecstasy etc.)’. 12% 831
Victim-involved
violence
‘ … hit someone until he/she was injured or
bleeding’.
14% 989
Cyberbullying … insulted someone on the internet’ (e.g. with
pictures / videos / comments, on SchülerVZ
[similar to facebook] etc.).
28% 1,918
Independent
variables
Abstinent
religiosity
Combination of the items ‘What meaning does
religion have in your life?’ (recoded to ‘not
important’/‘important’) and ‘Did you ever
drink so much alcohol that you were really
drunk?’ (recoded to ‘never’/‘once or more’)
0 (Abstinent areligious)
1 (Abstinent religious)
2 (Non-abstinent areligious)
3 (Non-abstinent religious)
34%
38%
19%
10%
2,285
2,561
1,261
698
Average level
religiosity in class
Average level of religiosity in class;
aggregated from survey (minus
respondent)
2.5 (.5) 6,948
Parental
monitoring
‘How well are your parents informed about your
leisure time?’
‘My parents know with whom I spend my
leisure time and where we are’.,
‘ … know what I do in my leisure time’, ‘ …
know my friends well’.
1 (never),
2 (sometimes),
3 (frequently),
4 (almost always)
3.1 (.8) 6,832
Victim experience ‘It happens that my mother/ my father beats me
or throws something at me’.
Mean of maternal and paternal
value, 1 (not at all correct)−4
(correct)
1.3 (.6) 6,796
. ‘Have you ever been a victim of a violent
assault?’
. ‘Somebody beat me up that violently that I
got hurt or was bleeding’
. ‘Somebody insulted me online (e.g. by
photos/videos/comments on SchülerVZ etc.)’
0 (no),
1 (yes)
10%
21%
717
1,430
Age 15.0
(1.1)
6,869
City 0 (Mannheim), 1 (Cologne) 41%,
59%
2,820
4,128
(Continued)
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Table A1. Continued
Variables Item Answer
Mean
(SD)/% n
Self-control . ‘I lose self-control rather quickly’., ‘Sometimes I take
risks just for fun’.
. ‘If I am really angry others should better keep away
from me’.
. ‘Excitement and adventure are more important to me
than security’.
. ‘I often act spontaneously without consideration’.
1 (not at all correct)-4
(correct), alpha scores
2.3 (.7) 6,900
Peer delinquency How many of your friends have done the following
things?
0 (none/unknown), 1 (>=1)
. ‘deliberately destroyed something in school, parks,
telephone boxes, metro’.
39% 2,661
. ‘stole something in a shop’. 34% 2,314
. ‘took drugs (marihuana, ecstasy etc.)’. 26% 1,817
. ‘hit someone until he/she was injured or bleeding’. 25% 1,746
. ‘insulted someone on the internet’ (e.g. with pictures/
videos/comments on SchülerVZ [similar to facebook]
etc.)
47% 3,207
Parents’ education ‘What is the highest educational level of your parents?’ 1 (no degree),
2 (lower secondary
education I),
3 (lower secondary
education II),
4 (university-entrance
diploma),
5 (graduate degree)
4.0%
14%
26%
25%
30%
239
802
1,456
1,431
1,696
Gender ‘Please specify your sex: I am a… ’ 0 (boy)
1 (girl)
48%
52%
3,331
3,616
Ethnic background place of birth of the parents (if both parents have a
different background, the mother’s place of birth was
prioritised)
German,
Turkish,
South European,
Russian/ex-Soviet,
ex-Yugoslav/Albanian,
Polish,
other Eastern European,
Arab/North African/Isl.
Asian,
Sub-Saharan African,
Central/East Asian,
Latin American,
West European/US/CA/AU,
other
49%
20%
4%
4%
3%
4%
1%
5%
2%
2%
1%
3%
1%
3,411
1,415
309
262
238
266
102
315
136
118
65
225
59
School type 1 (Upper secondary school)
2 (Comprehensive school)
3 (Lower secondary
school II)
4 (Lower secondary school I)
5 (Lower secondary school)
6 (Waldorf school)
48%
9%
23%
17%
2%
<1%
3,334
611
1,621
1,183
167
32
(Continued)
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Table A1. Continued
Brussels (Belgium)
Variables Item Answer
Mean
(SD)/% n
Dependent
variables
Most people have committed minor
offences thorough their life, how many of
the following have you committed in the
past year?
0 (never), 1 (yes, once in a while and
more)
Vandalism Property offences (tag, engrave, set a bin
on fire)
17% 515
Property offences Theft in a shop 26% 775
Drug abuse Consume soft drugs (e.g. marijuana, joint,
cannabis)
31% 921
Victim-involved
violence
Physical aggression (grappling) 23% 678
Independent
variables
Religiosity . ‘Do you have things in common with
people who belong to the same religion
as you?’
. ‘Do you consider yourself as religious?’
. ‘How often do you attend religious
services?’
1 (nothing in common) – 5 (a lot in
common), 1 (not believing) – 5 (very
religious), 1 (never) – 7 (everyday), factor
scores
2.0 (1.4) 2,846
Religious
affiliation
Atheist,
Christian,
Muslim,
other
31%,
38%,
28%,
3%
917
1,130
827
100
Parental
monitoring
parent knows what the child does after
school, where he/she
goes out, how the pocket money is spent,
what he/she does in leisure
time, which friends he/she has, and
whether parents know about their
child’s school notes
Row mean, 1 (never) to 5 (always) 3.8 (.8) 2,987
Perceived
discrimination
In the past year, how many times were you
treated unequally or discriminated
against in your school?
1 (never), 2 (less often), 3 (at least once a
month), 4 (at least once a week) 5
(daily)
1.5 (1.0) 2,954
Parents’ socio-
economic status
low,
middle,
high
18%,
38%,
45%
493
1,065
1,254
Gender 0 (boy),
1 (girl)
43%,
57%
1,282
1,724
School type Vocational (low),
technical (middle),
general (high)
12%,
31%,
57%
368
947
1,712
Source: Compiled by the authors using data from the Survey Lebenslagen und Risiken von Jugendlichen and ‘Study of
opinions and attitudes of young people in Brussels’.
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Table A2. Interaction between religiosity and abstinence (Cologne/Mannheim).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vandalism Property offence Drug abuse Victim-involved violence Bullying
Religiosity
Less religious (ref. more religious) 0.005 0.007 −0.001 −0.019* 0.015
(0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.014)
Non-abstinent (ref. abstinent) 0.085*** 0.064*** 0.115*** 0.068** 0.011
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.020)
Less religious # Non-abstinent 0.005 0.059* 0.110*** −0.062* 0.045*
(0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021)
Average class religiosity −0.006 0.004 −0.012 0.007 0.012
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014)
Constant 0.002 −0.104 −0.220** 0.011 −0.003
(0.102) (0.087) (0.072) (0.079) (0.104)
Observations 5304 5298 5293 5236 5147
AIC 2497.978 3195.052 794.433 1932.190 4302.733
Source: Compiled by the authors, using data from the Survey Lebenslagen und Risiken von Jugendlichen’.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, all controls from Table 4, +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table A3. Delinquency and main effects of religiosity (Cologne/Mannheim).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vandalism Property offence Drug abuse Victim-involved violence Bullying
Religiosity −0.008 −0.050** −0.052*** 0.056*** −0.047***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Non-abstinence 0.167*** 0.149*** 0.374*** 0.077*** 0.041**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Average class religiosity −0.003 0.012 −0.007 0.010 0.018
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014)
Observations 5304 5298 5293 5236 5147
AIC 2426.794 3149.047 386.776 1921.807 4296.770
Source: Compiled by the authors, using data from the Survey Lebenslagen und Risiken von Jugendlichen’.
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, beta coefficients, all controls from Table 4, +p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,
***p < 0.001.
Table A4. Mixed-effects negative binomial regression model of delinquency types in Cologne/
Mannheim (incidence).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vandalism
Property
offence Drug abuse
Victim-involved
violence Bullying
Religiosity
Abstinent religious (ref.)
Abstinent areligious −0.066 0.035 −0.376 −0.058 0.305**
(0.166) (0.164) (0.292) (0.156) (0.115)
Non-abstinent areligious 0.392* 0.915*** 1.744*** 0.461** 0.768***
(0.163) (0.157) (0.256) (0.154) (0.123)
Non-abstinent religious 0.245 0.606*** 0.832** 0.481*** 0.252+
(0.164) (0.177) (0.268) (0.142) (0.134)
Average class religiosity −0.390** −0.135 −0.774** −0.204+ −0.288*
(0.146) (0.167) (0.236) (0.122) (0.128)
Parental influence & personality
Parental monitoring −0.339*** −0.291*** −0.036 −0.138* −0.117*
(0.069) (0.071) (0.094) (0.062) (0.054)
Parental beating 0.115 0.179* 0.291** 0.225*** 0.152*
(0.074) (0.078) (0.101) (0.065) (0.060)
Self-control 0.730*** 0.268** 0.523*** 0.524*** 0.563***
(Continued )
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Table A4. Continued.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vandalism
Property
offence Drug abuse
Victim-involved
violence Bullying
(0.088) (0.085) (0.111) (0.076) (0.067)
Peers
Friends vandalise 1.589***
(0.138)
Friends steal 1.833***
(0.122)
Friends do drugs 3.577***
(0.194)
Victim of violence 0.332**
(0.110)
Friends violent 1.369***
(0.111)
Victim of bullying 0.760***
(0.080)
Friends are bullies 1.186***
(0.096)
Socio-demographics
Female (ref. male) −0.470*** −0.314** −0.735*** −0.865*** −0.445***
(0.111) (0.107) (0.142) (0.109) (0.081)
Age −0.034 0.060 0.187* −0.049 −0.007
(0.058) (0.060) (0.077) (0.049) (0.047)
Cologne 0.138 −0.044 −0.015 0.218+ 0.075
(0.134) (0.149) (0.209) (0.114) (0.119)
Parental education
no degree (ref.)
Lower sec. school I, no access to
general education
−0.323 −0.222 0.217 −0.014 −0.331
(0.283) (0.309) (0.456) (0.221) (0.207)
Lower sec. school II, access to
general education
−0.265 0.092 −0.125 0.055 −0.292
(0.273) (0.295) (0.448) (0.209) (0.200)
Upper sec. school −0.151 0.374 0.022 −0.069 −0.186
(0.280) (0.298) (0.456) (0.220) (0.205)
University −0.297 0.179 0.504 −0.063 −0.350+
(0.283) (0.301) (0.444) (0.225) (0.208)
Students’ school type
Upper secondary school
(Gymnasium) (ref.)
Comprehensive school 0.358 0.231 0.205 0.105 0.512*
(0.245) (0.278) (0.381) (0.205) (0.212)
Lower secondary school II
(Realschule)
0.083 0.125 0.495+ 0.049 0.322*
(0.167) (0.187) (0.254) (0.149) (0.150)
Lower secondary school I
(Hauptschule)
0.091 0.404+ 0.490 0.278 −0.103
(0.201) (0.225) (0.332) (0.169) (0.187)
Lower secondary school (Haupt-/
Realschule)
0.236 0.531 0.228 0.138 −0.151
(0.390) (0.442) (0.640) (0.329) (0.377)
Waldorf school −0.086 0.485 −0.663 −1.028 1.358*
(0.811) (0.992) (1.067) (0.845) (0.682)
Ethnicity
German (ref.)
Turkish 0.060 −0.127 0.153 0.524*** 0.710***
(0.164) (0.181) (0.252) (0.144) (0.126)
South European 0.163 0.487* 0.411 0.116 0.632***
(0.249) (0.238) (0.329) (0.235) (0.180)
Russian/ex-Soviet −0.103 0.046 −0.506 −0.018 0.481*
(0.282) (0.256) (0.389) (0.258) (0.209)
Ex-Yugoslav/Albanian −0.255 0.339 −0.918* 0.307 0.704***
(0.304) (0.270) (0.439) (0.236) (0.207)
Polish 0.396 0.406 0.802* 0.125 0.104
(0.259) (0.286) (0.389) (0.265) (0.215)
Eastern European (other) −0.019 −0.892* −0.665 −0.512 0.068
(Continued )
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Table A4. Continued.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Vandalism
Property
offence Drug abuse
Victim-involved
violence Bullying
(0.420) (0.357) (0.498) (0.434) (0.321)
Arab/North African/Islamic Asian −0.124 0.176 −0.029 −0.086 0.617**
(0.275) (0.300) (0.380) (0.241) (0.200)
Sub-Saharan African 0.232 0.165 −0.939+ 0.405 −0.308
(0.411) (0.335) (0.513) (0.306) (0.333)
Central/East Asian −0.571 −0.450 0.412 0.326 −0.028
(0.541) (0.422) (0.535) (0.378) (0.355)
Latin American 0.261 −0.322 0.601 −2.051** 0.876*
(0.410) (0.378) (0.445) (0.713) (0.440)
Western European/North American/
Australian
0.545* 0.232 0.207 0.240 0.168
(0.254) (0.237) (0.301) (0.251) (0.220)
other ethnicity 0.193 −0.471 −0.451 0.694+ 1.852***
(0.541) (0.619) (1.106) (0.402) (0.437)
Constant −1.453 −2.448* −5.914*** −1.999* −1.244
(1.067) (1.088) (1.388) (0.830) (0.833)
Observations 1505 1618 1350 1388 1814
AIC 3954.430 4926.633 4634.596 3450.236 7749.944
Source: Compiled by the authors, using data from the Survey Lebenslagen und Risiken von Jugendlichen.
Note: Two-level (individuals in classes) mixed-effects negative binomial regression, + p < 0.10, *p< 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table A5. Mixed-effects negative binomial regression model of delinquency types in Brussels
(incidence).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Vandalism Property offence Drug abuse Victim-involved violence
Religiosity −0.146* −0.110* −0.257*** 0.089*
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Atheist (ref.)
Christian 0.013 −0.203+ −0.195+ −0.041
(0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Muslim −0.425+ −0.926*** −0.833*** −0.504**
(0.23) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17)
Other −0.679+ −0.257 0.258 −0.115
(0.37) (0.25) (0.23) (0.26)
Discrimination & parental influence
Perceived discrimination 0.307*** 0.278*** 0.141*** 0.215***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Parental Control −0.626*** −0.454*** −0.534*** −0.389***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Socio-demographics
Female −0.950*** −0.221* −0.386*** −1.096***
(0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Age −0.037 −0.085* 0.039 0.034
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
High Education (ref.)
Middle Education 0.178 0.141 0.260* 0.511***
(0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10)
Low Education 0.226 0.322+ 0.421* 0.584***
(0.21) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
High Status (ref.)
Low Status −0.359+ −0.190 −0.302* 0.133
(0.19) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14)
Middle Status −0.136 −0.137 −0.104 0.192+
(0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Constant 2.044+ 2.478** 1.635* −0.421
(1.06) (0.82) (0.81) (0.81)
Observations 2547 2552 2545 2547
AIC 3200.593 4211.060 5909.748 3755.601
Source: Compiled by the authors, using data from the ‘Study of opinions and attitudes of young people in Brussels’.
Note: Two-level (individuals in schools) mixed-effects negative binomial regression, +p< 0.10, *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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